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Abstract—Connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) will
form the backbone of future next-generation intelligent trans-
portation systems (ITS) providing travel comfort, road safety,
along with a number of value-added services. Such a
transformation—which will be fuelled by concomitant ad-
vances in technologies for machine learning (ML) and wireless
communications—will enable a future vehicular ecosystem that
is better featured and more efficient. However, there are lurking
security problems related to the use of ML in such a critical
setting where an incorrect ML decision may not only be a
nuisance but can lead to loss of precious lives. In this paper, we
present an in-depth overview of the various challenges associated
with the application of ML in vehicular networks. In addition, we
formulate the ML pipeline of CAVs and present various potential
security issues associated with the adoption of ML methods. In
particular, we focus on the perspective of adversarial ML attacks
on CAVs and outline a solution to defend against adversarial
attacks in multiple settings.
Index Terms—Connected and autonomous vehicles, ma-
chine/deep learning, adversarial machine learning, adversarial
perturbation, perturbation detection, and robust machine learn-
ing.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs)
have emerged as a promising area of research. The connected
vehicles are an important component of intelligent transporta-
tion systems (ITS) in which vehicles communicate with each
other and with communications infrastructure to exchange
safety messages and other critical information (e.g., traffic and
road conditions). One of the main driving force for CAVs is
the advancement of machine learning (ML) methods, particu-
larly deep learning (DL), that are used for decision making
at different levels. Unlike conventional connected vehicles,
the autonomous (self-driving) vehicles have two important
characteristics; namely, automation capability and cooperation
(connectivity) [5]. In future smart cities, CAVs are expected
to have a profound impact on the vehicular ecosystem and
society.
The phenomenon of connected vehicles is realized through
technology known as vehicular networks or vehicular ad-hoc
networks (VANETs) [6]. Over the years, various configurations
of connected vehicles have been developed including the use of
dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) in the United
States and ITS-G5 in Europe based on the IEEE 802.11p
standard. However, a recent study [7] has shown many limita-
tions of such systems such as (1) short-lived infrastructure-
to-vehicle (I2V) connection, (2) non-guaranteed quality of
service (QoS), and (3) unbounded channel access delay, etc.
To address such limitations, the 3rd generation partnership
project (3GPP) has been initiated with a focus on leveraging
the high penetration rate of long term evolution (LTE) and
5G cellular networks to support vehicle-to-everything (V2X)
services [8]. The purpose of developing V2X technology is
to enable the communication between all entities encountered
in the road environment including vehicles, communications
infrastructure, pedestrians, cycles, etc.
The impressive ability of ML/DL to leverage increasingly
accessible data, along with the advancement in other concomi-
tant technologies (such as wireless communications), seems
to be set to enable autonomous and self-organizing connected
vehicles in the future. In addition, future vehicular networks
will evolve from normal to autonomous vehicles and will
enable ubiquitous Internet access on vehicles. ML will have
a predominant role in building the perception system of
autonomous and semi-autonomous connected vehicles.
Despite the development of different configurations of con-
nected vehicles, they are still vulnerable to various security
issues and there are various automotive attack surfaces that
can be exploited [9]. The threat is getting worse with the
development of fully autonomous vehicles. As the autonomous
vehicles are being equipped with many sensors such as cam-
eras, RADAR, LIDAR, and mechanical control units, etc.
These sensors share critical sensory information with onboard
devices through CAN bus and with other nearby vehicles as
well. The backbone of self-driving vehicles is the onboard
intelligent processing capabilities using the data collected
through the sensory system. This data can be used for many
other purposes, e.g., getting information about vehicle kinetics,
traffic flow, road, and network conditions, etc. Such data
can be potentially used for improving the performance of
the vehicular ecosystem using adaptive data-driven decision
making and can also be used to accomplish various destructive
objectives. Therefore, ensuring data integrity and security are
necessarily important to avoid various risks and attacks on
CAVs.
It is common for the perception and control systems of
CAVs to be built using ML/DL methods. However, ML/DL
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2Fig. 1: Outline of the paper
techniques have been recently found vulnerable to carefully
crafted adversarial perturbations [10] and different physical
world attacks have been successfully performed on the vision
system of autonomous cars [11], [12]. This has raised many
privacy and security concerns about the use of such methods
particularly for security-critical applications like CAVs. In this
paper, we aim to highlight various security issues associated
with the use of ML and we present a review of adversarial
ML literature mainly focusing on CAVs. In addition, we also
present a taxonomy of possible solutions to restrict adversarial
ML attacks and open research issues on autonomous, con-
nected vehicles, and ML.
ML in general and DL schemes specifically perform ex-
ceptionally well in learning hidden patterns from data. DL
schemes such as deep neural networks (DNN) have out-
performed human-level intelligence in many perception and
detection tasks by accurately learning from a large corpus
of training data and classifying/predicting with high accuracy
on unseen real-world test examples. As DL schemes produce
outstanding results, they have been used in many real-world
security-sensitive tasks such as perception system in self-
driving cars, anomaly and intrusion detection in vehicular
networks, etc. ML/DL schemes are designed for benign and
stationary environments where it is assumed that the training
and test data belongs to the same statistical distribution. The
application of this assumption in a real-world application is
flawed as training and test data can have different statistical
distributions which gives rise to an opening for adversaries
to compromise the ML/DL-based systems. Furthermore, the
lack of interpretability of the learning process, imperfections
in training process, and discontinuity in the input-output
relationship of DL schemes also resulted in an incentive for
adversaries to fool the deployed ML/DL system [13].
Contributions of this Paper: In this paper, we build upon the
existing literature available on CAVs and present a compre-
hensive review of that literature. The following are the major
contributions of this study.
1) We formulate the ML pipeline of CAVs and describe
in detail various security challenges that arise with the
increasing adoption of ML techniques in CAVs, specif-
ically emphasizing the challenges posed by adversarial
ML;
2) We present a taxonomy of various threat models and
highlight the generalization of attack surfaces for general
ML, autonomous, and connected vehicle applications;
3) We review existing adversarial ML attacks with a special
emphasis on their relevance for CAVs;
4) We review robust ML approaches and provide a tax-
onomy of these approaches with a special emphasis on
their relevance for CAVs; and
5) Finally, we highlight various open research problems
that require further investigation.
Organization of the Paper: The organization of this paper
is depicted in Figure 1. The history, introduction, and various
challenges associated with connected and automated vehicles
(CAVs) are presented in Section II. Section III presents an
3TABLE I: Comparison of this paper with existing survey and review papers on the security of machine learning (ML) and connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs). (Legend:
√
means covered;× means not covered; ≈ means partially covered.)
Year Authors Publisher Papers
Cited
Focused Area Conventional
Challenges
Threat
Models
Adversarial
ML
Robust
ML
Solutions
Autonomous
Vehicles
Connected
Vehicles
Open
Research
Issues
2014 Mejri et al.
[1]
Elsevier Vehicular
Communication
69 Security of vehicular
networks
√ × × × × √ ×
2016 Gardiner et
al. [2]
ACM Computing Sur-
veys (CSUR)
40 Security of ML for
malware classification
× √ √ ≈ × × ×
2018 Chakraborty
et al. [3]
arXiv 79 Adversarial attacks
and defenses
× √ √ √ × × ×
2018 Akhter et al.
[4]
IEEE Access 195 Adversarial attacks
and defenses in
computer vision
× × √ √ ≈ × ×
2018 Siegel et al.
[14]
IEEE Transactions on
ITS
198 Survey on connected
vehicles’ landscape
√ × × × × √ ×
2018 Hussain et
al. [6]
IEEE Communica-
tions Surveys and
Tutorials (COMST)
230 Autonomous cars: re-
search results, issues
and future challenges
√ × × × √ × √
2019 Yuan et al.
[15]
IEEE Transactions on
NN & LS (TNNLS)
146 Adversarial attacks
and defenses for deep
learning systems
× √ √ √ × × ×
2019 Wang et al.
[16]
arXiv 128 Adversarial ML at-
tacks and defenses in
text domain
× √ √ √ × × ×
2019 Our Paper 239 Security of CAVs and
ML
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
overview of the ML pipeline in CAVs. The detailed overview
of adversarial ML and its threats for CAVs are described
in Section IV. An outline of various solutions to robustify
applications of ML along with common methods and recom-
mendations for evaluating robustness are presented in Section
V. Section VI presents open research problems on the use of
ML in the context of CAVs. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section VII. A summary of the salient acronyms used in this
paper is presented in Table II for convenience.
TABLE II: List of Acronyms
BSM Basic Safety Message
BFGS Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno Algorithm
CAN Controller Area Network
CAVs Connected and Automated (Autonomous) Vehicles
CIFAR Canadian Institute for Advanced Research
CNN Convolutional Neural Network
C&W Carlini and Wagner Algorithm
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DL Deep Learning
DNN Deep Neural Network
ECUs Electronic Control Units
FGSM Fast Gradient Sign Method
GAN Generative Adversarial Networks
GPS Global Positioning System
GTSDB German Traffic Sign Detection Benchmark
GTSRB German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark
IoV Internet of Vehicles
JSMA Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack
L-BFGS Limited-memory BFGS
LIDAR LIght Detection and Ranging
LISA Laboratory for Intelligent & Safe Automobiles
LSTM Long Short-Term Memory
MC/DC Modified Condition/Decision Coverage
ML Machine Learning
MNIST Modified National Institute of Standards and Technology
ODD Operational Design Domain
RADAR RAdio Detection And Ranging
RL Reinforcement Learning
RSU Road-Side Unit
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers
SVM Support Vector Machine
VANETs Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
V2I Vehicle to Infrastructure
V2V Vehicle to Vehicle
V2X Vehicle to Everything
VGG (Oxford University’s) Visual Geometry Group
YOLO You Only Look Once (Classifier)
II. CONNECTED AND AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES (CAVS):
HISTORY, INTRODUCTION, AND CHALLENGES
In this section, we provide the history, introduction, back-
ground of CAVs along with different conventional and security
challenges associated with them.
A. Autonomous Vehicles and Levels of Automation
The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) has defined a
taxonomy of driving automation that is organized in six levels.
The SAE defined the potential of driving automation at each
level that is described next and depicted in Figure 2. Moreover,
according to a recent scientometric and bibliometric review
article on autonomous vehicles [17], different naming conven-
tions have been used over the years to refer to autonomous
vehicles. These names are illustrated in Figure 3; note that the
year denotes the publication year of first paper mentioning the
corresponding name.
• Level 0 No automation: all driving tasks and major
systems are controlled by a human driver;
• Level 1 Function-specific automation: provides limited
driver assistance, e.g., lateral or longitudinal motion con-
trol;
• Level 2 Partial driving automation: at least two primary
control functions are combined to perform an action, e.g.,
lane keeping assistance and adaptive cruise control;
• Level 3 Conditional driving automation: enables limited
self-driving automation, i.e., allows the driver to tem-
porarily deviate his attention from driving to perform
another activity but the presence of driver is always
required to retake control within a few seconds;
• Level 4 High driving automation: an automated driving
system performs all dynamic tasks of driving, e.g., mon-
itoring of the environment and motion control. However,
the driver is capable of getting full control of the vehicle’s
safety-critical functions under certain scenarios;
• Level 5 Self-driving automation: an automated driving
system performs all dynamic functions of driving and
4Fig. 2: The taxonomy of the levels of automation in driving.
Fig. 3: The illustration of different naming conventions used for referring autonomous
vehicles in past years, the year denotes the publication year of first paper mentioning
corresponding name. We see that self-driving car is not entirely a new concept and it is
referred to through a number of terms. (Source: [17])
monitors the nearby environment for the entire trip,
without any human intervention at any time.
The SAE defines the operational design domain (ODD) for
the safe operation of autonomous vehicles as “the specific
conditions under which a given driving automation system
or feature thereof is designed to function, including, but not
limited to, driving modes” [18]. ODD refers to the domain of
operation which an autonomous vehicle has to deal with. An
ODD representing an ability to drive in good weather condi-
tions is quite different from an ODD that embraces all kinds
of weather and lighting conditions. The SAE recommends
that ODD should be monitored at run-time to gauge if the
autonomous vehicle is in a situation that it was designed to
safely handle.
B. Development of Autonomous Vehicles: Historical Overview
Self-driving vehicles, especially ones considering lower
levels of automation (referring to the taxonomy of automation
as presented in Figure 2), have existed for a long time. In 1925,
Francis Udina presented a remote controlled car famously
known as American wonder. In the 1939-1940 New York
World’s Fair, General Motors Futurama exhibited aspects of
what we call self-driving car today. The first work around the
design and development of self-driving vehicles was initiated
by General Motors and RCA in early 1950 [19] that was
followed by Prof. Robert Fenton at The Ohio State University
from 1964–80.
In 1986, Ernst Dickens at University of Munich designed
a robotic van that can drive autonomously without traffic and
by 1987 the robotic van drove up to 60 Kmhr. This group
had also started the development of video image processing
to recognize driving scenes [20] and it was followed by a
demonstration performed under Eureka Prometheus project.
The super-smart vehicle systems (SSVS) program in Europe
[21] and Japan [22] were also based on the earlier work
of Ernst Dickens. In 1992, four vehicles drove in a convoy
using magnetic markers on the road for relative positioning,
a similar test was repeated in 1997 with eight vehicles using
radar systems and V2V communications. This work has paved
the way for modern adaptive cruise control and automated
emergency braking systems. This R&D work then witnessed
initiatives of programs like the PATH Program by Caltrans and
5the University of California in 1986, in particular, the work
on self-driving got huge popularity with the demonstration
of research work done by the national automated highway
systems consortium (NAHSC) during 1994-98 [23] and this
climax remained until 2003.
In the year 2002, Defence Advanced Research Project
Agency (DARPA) announced the grand autonomous vehicles
challenge, first episode was held in 2004 where very few cars
were able to navigate miles through the Mojave desert. The
first grand challenge was won by Carnegie Mellons University
(CMU) where their car only drove nearly seven miles where
the finish line was at 140 miles. In 2005, the second episode
of DARPA grand challenge was held, in this episode, five out
of twenty-three teams were able to make it through to the
finish line. This time Stanford University’s vehicle “Stanley”
has won the challenge. In the third episode of DARPA grand
challenge in 2007, universities were invited to present the
autonomous vehicles on busy roads to shift the perception of
the public, tech, and automobile industries about the design
and feasibility of autonomous vehicles.
In 2007, Google hired the team leads of Stanford and CMU
autonomous vehicle projects and started pushing towards their
self-driving car design on the public roads. By the year 2010,
Google’s self-driving car has navigated approximately 140
thousand miles on the roads of California in quest of achieving
the target of 10 million miles by 2020. In 2013, VisLab (a
spin-off company of the University of Parma) successfully
completed the international autonomous driving challenge
by driving two orange vans 15000 km with minimal driver
interventions from University of Parma in Italy to Shanghai
in China. A year later in 2014, Volvo demonstrated the road
train concept where one vehicle controls several other vehicles
behind it in order to avoid road congestion. In 2016, Tesla cars
have started the commercial sales of highway speed intelligent
cruise control based cars with minimal human intervention.
In October 2018, Google self-driving car has successfully
achieved the 10 million miles target. The main aim of Google’s
self-driving car program is to reduce the number of deaths
caused by traffic accidents by half and to date, they are
working towards achieving this ambitious goal. It is expected
that by 2020 the state departments of motor vehicles (DMV)
may permit self-driving cars on the highways with their special
lanes and control settings. By 2025, it is expected that public
transportation will also become driver-less and by 2030 it is
foresighted that we will have level-5 autonomous vehicles1. A
timeline for the development of autonomous vehicles over the
past decades is depicted in Figure 4.
C. Introduction to Connected and Autonomous Vehicles
(CAVs)
The term connected vehicles refers to the technologies,
services, and applications that together enable inter-vehicles
connectivity. In connected vehicles’ settings, the vehicles
are equipped with a wide variety of onboard sensors that
communicate with each other via CAN bus and nearby
communication infrastructures and vehicles (as illustrated in
1https://bit.ly/2Kei9ci
Fig. 4: The timeline for the development of autonomous vehicles.
Fig. 5: The basic system architecture of connected vehicles having three types of
communications: vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), infrastructure-to-infrastructure (I2I), and
infrastructure-to-vehicle (I2V).
Figure 5). The applications of connected vehicles include ev-
erything from traffic safety, roadside assistance, infotainment,
6Fig. 6: Autonomous vehicle’s major sensor types, their range, and position (figure adapted from [24]).
efficiency, telematics, and remote diagnostics to autonomous
vehicles and GPS. In general, the connected vehicles can be
regarded as a cooperative intelligent transport system [25] and
fundamental component of the internet of vehicles (IoV) [26].
A review of truck platooning automation projects formulating
the settings of connected vehicles (described earlier) together
with various sensors (i.e., RADAR, LIDAR, localization, laser
scanners, etc.) and computer vision techniques is presented
in [27]. The key purpose of initiating and investigating such
projects is to reduce energy consumption and personnel costs
by automated operation of following vehicles. Furthermore, it
has been suggested in the literature that throughput on urban
roads can be doubled using vehicle platooning [28].
CAVs is an emerging area of research that is drawing sub-
stantial attention from both academia and industry. The idea
of connected vehicles has been conceptualized to enable inter-
vehicle communications to provide better traffic flow, road
safety, and greener vehicular environment while reducing fuel
consumption and travel cost. There are two types of nodes in
a network of connected vehicles: (1) vehicles having onboard
units (OBUs), and (2) roadside wireless communication in-
frastructure or roadside units (RSUs). The basic configuration
of a vehicular network is shown in Figure 5. There are three
modes of communications in such networks: vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V), infrastructure-to-infrastructure (I2I), and vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I). Besides these, there are two more types
of communication—vehicle to pedestrian (V2P) and vehicle
to anything (V2X)—that are expected to become part of the
future connected vehicular ecosystem.
In modern vehicles, self-contained embedded systems called
electronic control units (ECUs) are used to digitally control a
heterogeneous combination of components (such as brakes,
lighting, entertainment, and drivetrain/powertrain, etc.) [29].
There are more than 100 such embedded ECUs in a car that
are executing about 100 million expressions of code and are
interconnected to control and provide different functionalities
such as acceleration, steering, and braking [30]. The security
of ECUs can be compromised and remote attacks can be
realized to gain control of the vehicle as illustrated in [29].
Modern CAVs utilize a number of onboard sensors includ-
ing proximity, short, middle, and long range sensors. While
each of these sensors works in its dedicated range, they can
act together to detect objects and obstacles over a wide range.
The major types of sensors deployed in autonomous vehicles
and their sensing range are shown in Figure 6 and are briefly
discussed next.
• Proximity Sensors (5m): Ultrasonic sensors are proximity
sensors that are designed to detect nearby obstacles when
the car is moving at a low speed, especially, they provide
parking assistance.
• Short Range Sensors (30m): There are two types of short-
range sensors: (1) forward and backward cameras and
(2) short range radars (SRR). Forward cameras assist
in traffic signs recognition and lane departure while
backward cameras provide parking assistance and SRR
help in blind spot detection and cross traffic alert.
• Medium Range Sensors (80-160m): The LIDAR and
medium-range radars (MRR) are designed with a medium
range and are used for pedestrian detection and collision
avoidance.
• Long Range Sensors (250m): Long range radars (LRR)
enable adaptive cruise control (ACC) at high speeds in
conjunction with the information collected from internal
sensors and from other vehicles and nearby RSU [31].
The software design of the autonomous vehicles utilizing
ML/DL schemes is divided into five inter-connected mod-
ules; namely, environmental perception, a mapping module,
planning module, controller module, and system supervisor.
The software modules take input from the sensor block of
autonomous vehicles and output intelligent actuator control
commands. Figure 7 highlights the software design of the
autonomous vehicles and it also provides the sensory input
required for each software module to perform the designated
task.
7Fig. 7: The systematic software workflow of autonomous vehicles. Nuts and bolts of all important operational blocks of software workflows are depicted to provide reader with a
better understanding of the system design involved in developing a state-of-art autonomous vehicle.
D. Security-Related Challenges in Developing Robust CAVs
Modern vehicles are controlled by complex distributed com-
puter systems comprising millions of lines of code executing
on tens of heterogeneous processors with rich connectivity
provided by internal networks (e.g., CAN) [9]. While this
structure has offered significant efficiency, safety, and cost
benefits, it has also created the opportunity for new attacks.
Ensuring the integrity and security of vehicular systems is
crucial, as they are intended to provide road safety and are
essentially life critical. Vehicular networks are designed using
a combination of different technologies and there are various
attack surfaces which can be broadly classified into internal
and external attacks. Different types of attacks on vehicular
networks are described below.
1) Application Layer Attacks: The application layer attacks
affect the functionality of a specific vehicular application such
as beaconing and message spoofing. Application layer attacks
can be broadly classified as integrity or authenticity attacks
and are briefly described below.
(a) Integrity Attacks: In the message fabrication attack, the
adversary continuously listens to the wireless medium
and upon receiving each message, fabricates its content
accordingly and rebroadcasts it to the network. Mod-
ification of each message may have a different effect
on the system state and depends solely on the design
of the longitudinal control system. A comprehensive
survey on attacks on the fundamental security goals, i.e.,
confidentiality, integrity, and availability can be found in
[32].
In the spoofing attack, the adversary imitates another
vehicle in the network to inject falsified messages into
the target vehicle or a specific vehicle preceding the
target. Therefore, the physical presence of the attacker
close to the target vehicle is necessarily not required. In
a recent study [33], the use of onboard ADAS sensors is
proposed for the detection of location spoofing attack in
vehicular networks. A similar type of attack in a vehicular
network can be GPS spoofing/jamming attack [34] in
which an attacker transmits false location information by
generating strong GPS signals from a satellite simulator.
In addition, a thief can use integrated GPS/GSM jammer
to restrain a vehicle’s anti-theft system from reporting the
vehicle’s actual location [35].
In the replay attack, the adversary stores the message
received by one of the network’s nodes and tries to replay
it later to attain evil goals [36]. The replayed message
contains old information that can cause different hazards
to both the vehicular network and its nodes. For example,
consider the message replaying attack by a malicious
vehicle that is attempting to jam traffic [37].
(b) Authenticity Attacks: Authenticity is another major chal-
lenge in vehicular networks which refers to protecting the
vehicular network from inside and outside malicious vehi-
cles (possessing falsified identity) by denying their access
to the system [38]. There are two types of authenticity
attacks; namely, Sybil attack and impersonation attacks
[39]. In a Sybil attack, a malicious vehicle pretends many
fake identities [40] and in an impersonation attack, the
adversary exploits a legitimate vehicle to obtain network
access and performs malicious activities. For example, a
malicious vehicle can impersonate a few non-malicious
vehicles to broadcast falsified messages [41]. This type
of attack is also known as the masquerading attack.
To avoid application layer attacks, various cryptographic
approaches can be effectively leveraged especially when an
attacker is a malicious outsider [1]. For instance, digital
signatures can be used to ensure messages’ integrity and
to protect them against unauthorized use [42]. In addition,
digital signatures can potentially provide both data and entity
level authentication. Moreover, to prevent replay attacks, a
timestamp-based random number (nonce) can be embedded
within messages. While the aforementioned methods are gen-
eral, there are other unprecedented challenges related to vehic-
ular networks implementation, deployment, and standardiza-
tion. For example, protection against security threats becomes
more challenging with the presence of a trusted compromised
vehicle with a valid certificate. In such cases, data-driven
anomaly detection methods can be used [43], [44]. A survey
on anomaly detection for enhancing the security of connected
vehicles is presented in [45].
82) Network Layer Attacks: Network layer attacks are dif-
ferent from the application layer attacks in a way that they can
be launched in a distributed manner. One prominent example
of such attacks on vehicular systems is the use of vehicular
botnets to attempt a denial of service (DoS) or distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attack. The potential of vehicular
network-based botnet attack for autonomous vehicles is pre-
sented in [46]. The study demonstrates that such an attack can
cause severe physical congestion on hot spot road segments
resulting in an increased trip duration of vehicles in the target
area. Another way to realize the DoS attack is to use network
jamming that causes disruption in the communications network
over a small or large geographic area. As discussed earlier,
current configurations of vehicular networks are based on the
IEEE 802.11p standard that uses single control channel (CCH)
with multiple service channels (SCH) and can be attacked
by attempting single channel or multi-channel jamming by
swiping between all channels. Various conventional techniques
can be adopted to mitigate network layer attacks such as
frequency hopping, channel, and technology switching, etc.
Coalition or platooning attack is a similar type of attack
in which a group of compromised vehicles can cooperate to
perform malicious activities such as blocking or interrupting
communications between legitimate vehicles.
3) System Level Attacks: The attacks on the vehicle’s
hardware and software are known as system level attacks and
can be performed by either malicious insiders at the time of
development or outsiders using unattended vehicular access.
Such attacks are more serious in nature as they can cause
damage even in the presence of the deployed state of the
art security measures and secure end-to-end communications
[47]. For instance, if the onboard hardware or software system
of a vehicle is maliciously modified then the information
exchange between the vehicle and communication systems
will be inaccurate and with such a phenomenon the overall
performance and security of the vehicular network will be
compromised. In [48], authors investigated a non-invasive
sensor spoofing attack on car’s anti-lock braking system such
that the braking system mistakenly reports a specific velocity.
4) Privacy Breaches: In vehicular networks, vehicles
broadcast safety messages periodically that contain critical
information such as vehicle identity, current location, velocity,
acceleration, etc. The adversary can exploit such kind of
information by attempting an eavesdropping attack which is
a type of passive attack and is more difficult to be detected.
Therefore, preserving the privacy of vehicles and drivers is
of utmost importance. This allows the vehicles to commu-
nicate with each other without disclosing their identities,
which is accomplished by masking their identities, e.g., using
pseudonyms. In vehicular networks, knowing the origin of
the message is crucial for authentication purposes, therefore,
vehicles should be equipped with privacy-preserving authen-
tication mechanism ensuring that the communication among
vehicles (V2V) and with infrastructure (V2I) is confidential.
However, inter-vehicular communication can be eavesdropped
by anyone within the radio range, e.g., a malicious vehicle
can collect and misuse confidential information. Similarly, an
attacker can construct location profiles of vehicles by establish-
ing a connection with the RSU. Therefore, the effectiveness
of pseudonymous or even complete anonymous schemes in
vehicular networks remains vulnerable to privacy breaches
[49].
5) Sensors Attacks: Although sensors of autonomous vehi-
cles are by design resilient to environmental noises such as
acoustical interference from nearby objects and vehicles, etc.
However, current sensors cannot resist intentional noise and
it can be injected to realize various attacks such as jamming
and spoofing.
6) Attacks on Perception System: The perception system
of self-driving vehicles is developed using various computer
vision techniques including modern ML/DL-based methods
for identifying objects, e.g., pedestrians, traffics signs, and
symbols, etc. The perception system of self-driving vehicle
is highly vulnerable to the physical world and adversarial
attacks. For example, suppose we’re learning a controller f(x)
to predict the steering angle in an autonomous car as a function
of the vision-based input (captured into a feature vector x).
The adversary may introduce small manipulations (i.e., x is
modified into x′) such that the predicted steering angle f(x′)
is maximally distant from the optimal angle y.
7) Intrusion Detection: The detection of malicious activ-
ities is one of the major challenges of VANETs. Intrusion
detection systems enable the identification of various types of
attacks being performed on the system, e.g., sink- and black-
hole attacks, etc. Without such a system, communication in
vehicular networks is highly vulnerable to numerous attacks
such as selective forwarding rushing, and Sybil attacks, etc.
To detect the selective forwarding attack, a trust system based
method utilizing local and global detection of attacks among
inter-nodes mutual monitoring and detection of abnormal
driving patterns is presented in [50]. Ali et al. proposed a
system for intelligent intrusion detection of gray holes and
rushing attack [51].
8) Certificate Revocation: The security mechanism of ve-
hicular networks is based on trusted certification authority
(CA) that manages the identities and credentials of the vehicles
by issuing valid certificates to them. The vehicles are essen-
tially unable to operate in the system without a valid certificate
and validity of certificate must be revoked after a certain
amount of time. The revocation process is a challenging task
administratively due to challenges such as the identification
of nodes with illegitimate behavior and the need to change
the registered domain. Moreover, it is necessary to restrain
malicious nodes by revoking their certificates to prevent them
from attacking the system. To tackle this problem, three
different certificate revocation protocols have been proposed
in [52].
E. Non-Security-Related Challenges in Deploying CAVs
The phenomenon of connected vehicles is realized using
a technology named vehicular networks which have various
challenges that need to be addressed for their efficient deploy-
ment in the longer term. Various challenges associated with
vehicular networks are described below.
9Fig. 8: The machine learning (ML) pipeline of CAVs comprising of four major modules: (1) perception; (2) prediction; (3) planning; and (4) control.
1) High Mobility of Nodes: The large scale mobility of
vehicles in vehicular networks result in a highly dynamic
topology; thus, raising several challenges for the communica-
tion networks [53]. In addition, the dynamic nature of traffic
can lead to a partitioned network having isolated clusters
of nodes [54]. As the connections between the vehicles and
nearby RSUs are short-lived, the wireless channel coherence
time is short. This makes accurate real-time channel estimation
more challenging at the receiver end. This necessitates the
design of dynamic and robust resource management protocols
that can efficiently utilize available resources while adapting
to the vehicular density variations [55].
2) Heterogeneous and Stringent QoS Requirements: In
vehicular networks, there are different modes of communi-
cations that can be broadly categorized into V2V and V2I
communications. In V2V communications, vehicles exchange
safety-critical information (e.g., information beacons, road
and traffic conditions) among each other known as basic
safety messages (BSM). This communication, which can be
performed periodically or when triggered by some event,
requires high reliability and is sensitive to delay [56]. In V2I
communications, on the other hand, vehicles can communicate
with nearby communications infrastructure to get support for
route planning, traffic information, operational data, and to
access entertainment services that requires more bandwidth
and frequent access to the Internet, e.g., for downloading
high-quality maps and accessing infotainment services, etc.
Therefore, the heterogeneous and stringent QoS requirements
of VANETs cannot be simultaneously met with traditional
wireless design approaches.
3) Learning Dynamics of Vehicular Networks: As dis-
cussed above, vehicular networks exhibit high dynamicity;
thus, to meet the real-time and stringent requirements of
vehicular networks, historical data-driven predictive strategies
can be adopted, e.g., traditional methods like hidden Markov
models (HMM) and Bayesian methods [56]. In addition to
using traditional ML methods, more sophisticated DL models
can be used, for example, recurrent neural networks (RNN)
and long short term memory (LSTM) have been shown ben-
eficial for time series data and can be potentially used for
modeling temporal dynamics of vehicular networks.
4) Network Congestion Control: Vehicular networks are
geographically unbounded and can be developed for a city,
several cities, and countries as well. The unbounded nature
of vehicular networks leads to the challenge of network
congestion [57]. As the traffic density is high in urban areas
as compared to rural areas, particularly during rush hours, that
can possibly lead to network congestion issues.
5) Time Constraints: The efficient application of vehicular
networks requires hard real-time guarantees because it lays
out the foundation for many other applications and services
that require strict deadlines [58], for example, traffic flow
prediction [59], traffic congestion control [60], and path plan-
ning [61]. Therefore, safety messages should be broadcasted
in acceptable time either by vehicles or RSUs.
III. THE ML PIPELINE IN CAVS
The driving task elements of self-driving vehicles that can
benefit from ML can be broadly categorized into the following
four major components (as shown in Figure 8).
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TABLE III: Overview of machine learning (ML)-based research on different vehicular network’s applications
Authors Application Methodology
Yao et al. [62]
Location prediction based scheduling and routing
Hidden Markov models
Xue et al. [63] Variable-order Markov models
Zeng et al. [64] Recursive least squares
Karami et al. [65] Network congestion control Feed forward neural networkTaherkhani et al. [66] k-means clustering
Li et al. [67] Load balancing Reinforcement learning
Taylor et al. [68] Network security LSTM
Zheng et al. [69] Virtual resource allocation Reinforcement learning
Atallah et al. [70], [71] Resource management Reinforcement learning
Ye et al. [57] Distributed resource management Reinforcement learning
Kim et al. [72] Vehicle trajectory prediction Reinforcement learning
1) Perception: assists in perceiving the nearby environment
and recognizing objects;
2) Prediction: predicting the actions of perceived objects,
i.e., how environmental actors such as vehicles and
pedestrians will move;
3) Planning: route planning of vehicle, i.e., how to reach
from point A to B;
4) Decision Making & Control: making decisions relating
to vehicle movement, i.e., how to make the longitudinal
and lateral decisions to control and steer the vehicle.
These components are combined to develop a feedback
system for enabling the phenomenon of self-driving without
any human intervention. This ML pipeline can then facilitate
autonomous real-time decisions by leveraging insights from
the diverse types of data (e.g., vehicles’ behavioral patterns,
network topology, vehicles’ locations, and kinetics informa-
tion, etc.) that can be in easily gathered by CAVs.
In the remainder of this section, we will discuss some of
the most prominent applications of ML-based methods for
performing these tasks (a summary is presented in Table III).
A. Applications of ML for the Perception Task in CAVs
Different ML techniques, particularly, DL models have
widely been used for developing the perception system of
autonomous vehicles [73]. In addition to using video cameras
as major visionary sensors, these vehicles also use other sen-
sors for detection of different events in the car’s surroundings,
e.g., RADAR and LIDAR. The surrounding environment of
the autonomous vehicles is perceived in two stages [74]. In
the first stage, the whole road is scanned for the detection
of changes in the driving conditions such as traffic signs and
lights, pedestrian crossing, and other obstacles, etc. In the sec-
ond stage, knowledge about the other vehicles is acquired. In
[75], a CNN model is trained for developing direct perception
representation of autonomous vehicles.
B. Applications of ML for the Prediction Task in CAVs
In CAVs, accurate and timely prediction of different events
encountered in driving scenes is another important task which
is mainly accomplished using different ML and DL algorithms.
For instance, autonomous vehicles uses DL models for the
detection and localization of obstacles [76], different objects
(e.g., vehicles, pedestrians, and bikes, etc.) [77] and their
behavior (e.g., tracking pedestrians along the way [78]) and
traffic signs [79] and traffic lights recognition [80]. Another
prediction tasks in CAVs that involve the application of
ML/DL methods are vehicle trajectory and location prediction
[81], efficient and intelligent wireless communication [82],
and traffic flow prediction and modeling [83]. Moreover, ML
schemes have also been used for the prediction of uncertainties
in autonomous driving conditions [84].
C. Applications of ML for the Planning Task in CAVs
CAVs are equipped with onboard data processing com-
patibilities and they intelligently process the data collected
from heterogeneous sensors for efficient route planning and
for other optimized operations using different ML and DL
techniques. The key goal of route planning is to reach the
destination in a small amount of time while avoiding traffic
congestion, potholes, and other vehicles by navigating through
GPS and consuming less fuel as possible. In the literature,
motion planning of autonomous vehicles is studied in three
dimensions: (1) finding a path for reaching destination point;
(2) searching for the fastest manoeuvre; and (3) determining
the most feasible trajectory [85]. Moreover, to avoid collisions
between vehicles in CAVs, predicting the trajectories of other
vehicles is a crucial task for the planning trajectory of an
autonomous vehicle [86]. For instance, Li et al. presented
a hybrid approach to model uncertainty in vehicle trajectory
prediction for CAVs application using deep learning and kernel
density estimation [87].
D. Applications of ML for the Decision Making and Control
In recent years, DL based algorithms have been extensively
used for control of autonomous vehicles that are refined
through millions of kilometers of test drives. For instance,
Bojarski et al. presented a CNN based end-to-end learning
framework for self-driving cars [88]. The model was able to
drive the car on local roads with or without markings and
on highways with small training data. In a similar study,
CNN is trained for end-to-end learning of lane keeping for
autonomous cars [89]. Recently, researchers have now started
working on utilizing deep reinforcement learning (RL) for
performing actions and decision making in driving conditions
[90]. Bouton et al. proposed a generic approach to enforce
probabilistic guarantees on RL learning for which they derived
an exploration strategy that restricts the RL agent to choose
among only those actions that satisfy a desired probabilistic
specification criteria prior to training [91]. Moreover, human-
like speed control of autonomous vehicles using deep RL
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Fig. 9: The illustration of the generalization of attack surfaces in ML systems: generic model (top), autonomous vehicles model (middle), and connected vehicles model (bottom).
with double Q-learning is presented in [92] that uses scenes
generated by naturalistic driving data for learning. In [93],
authors presented an integrated framework that uses a deep
RL based approach for dynamic orchestration of networking,
caching, and computing resources for connected vehicles.
In addition, ML-based methods have been used for many
other applications in CAVs. For example, adaptive traffic flow
in which smart infrastructure integrates V2V signals from the
moving cars to optimize speed limits, traffic-light timing, and
the number of lanes in each direction on the basis of the
actual traffic load. The traffic flow can be further improved in
CAVs by using cooperative adaptive cruise control technology
[94]. Also, vehicles can take advantage of cruise control and
save fuel by following one another in the form of vehicles
platoons. Moreover, DL based methods have been proposed
for intrusion detection for in-vehicle security of CAN bus [95].
The overview of intelligent and connected vehicles, current
and future perspectives are presented in [96].
Autonomous vehicles are evolving through four stages of
development. The first stage includes passive warning and
convenience systems such as front and backward facing cam-
eras, cross-traffic warning mechanism, radar for blind spot
detection, etc. These warning systems use different computer
vision and machine learning techniques to perceive the sur-
rounding views of the vehicle on the road and to recognize
traffic signs, static, and moving objects. In the second stage,
these systems are used to assist the active control system of
the vehicle while parking, braking, and to prevent backing
over unseen objects. In the third stage, the vehicle is equipped
with some semi-autonomous operations—as the vehicle may
behave unexpectedly and the on seat driver should be able to
resume control. In the final stage, the vehicle is designed to
perform fully autonomous operations.
CAVs together formulate the settings of the self-driving
vehicular network and there is a strong synergy between
them [5]. In addition, autonomous vehicles are an important
component of future vehicular networks that are equipped
with complex sensory equipment. The autonomous vehicular
networks are predictive and adaptive to their environments and
are designed with two fundamental goals, i.e., autonomy and
interactivity. The first goal enables the network to monitor,
plan, and control itself and the later ensures that the infras-
tructure is transparent and friendly to interact with.
The deployment of ML in CAVs entails the following
stages:
(a) Data Collection: Input data is collected using sensors or
from other digital repositories. In autonomous vehicles,
input data is collected using a complex sensory network,
e.g., cameras, RADAR, GPS, etc. (see Figure 6); in
a connected vehicular ecosystem, there is also inter-
vehicle information communication.
(b) (Pre-)Processing: The heterogeneous data (video im-
agery, network, and traffic information, etc.) collected by
the sensors is then digitally processed and appropriate
features (e.g., traffic signs information and traffic flow
information, etc.) are extracted.
(c) Model Training: Using the extracted features from the
input data, a ML model is trained to recognize and
distinguish between different objects events encountered
in the driving environment, e.g., recognizing moving
objects like pedestrian, vehicles, and cyclists, etc. and
distinguishing between traffic signs, i.e., stop or speed
limit sign, etc.
(d) Decision or Action: A decision or an action (e.g., stop-
ping the car at the stop sign and predicting traffic flow
based on the knowledge acquired by the vehicular net-
work) is performed according to the learned knowledge
and underlying system.
We present an illustration of the generalization of attack
surfaces in ML systems from generic models to the more
specific cases of autonomous and connected vehicles in Figure
9. As we shall discuss later in the paper, each of these stages
is vulnerable to adversarial intrusion since an adversary can
try to manipulate the data collection and processing system,
tamper the model, or its outputs.
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Fig. 10: The taxonomy of adversarial examples, perturbation methods, and benchmarks (datasets and models).
IV. ADVERSARIAL ML ATTACKS AND THE ADVERSARIAL
ML THREAT FOR CAVS
A comprehensive overview of adversarial ML in the context
of CAVs is presented in this section.
A. Adversarial Examples
Formally, adversarial examples are defined as inputs to a
deployed ML/DL model created by an attacker by adding an
imperceptible perturbation in the actual input to compromise
the integrity of the ML/DL model. An adversarial sample x∗
is created by adding a small carefully crafted perturbation
δ to the correctly classified sample x. The perturbation δ is
calculated by approximating the optimization problem given
in Eq. 1 iteratively until the crafted adversarial example
gets classified by ML classifier f(.) in targeted class t. A
taxonomy of adversarial examples, perturbation methods, and
benchmarks is presented in Figure 10.
x∗ = x+ argmin
δx
{‖δ‖ : f(x+ δ) = t} (1)
1) Adversarial Attacks: An adversarial attack affecting the
training phase of the learning process is termed as poisoning
attack where an attacker compromises the learning process of
the ML/DL scheme by manipulating the training data [97],
whereas the adversarial attack on the inference phase of the
learning process is termed as evasion attack where an attacker
manipulates the test data or real-time inputs to the deployed
model for producing a false result [98]. Usually, examples used
for fooling the ML/DL schemes at inference time are called
adversarial examples.
2) Adversarial Perturbations: The adversarial perturbation
crafting is divided in three major categories; namely, local
search, combinatorial optimization, and convex relaxation.
This division is based on solving the objective function given
in Eq. 1. Local search is the most common method of gener-
ating adversarial perturbations where the adversarial examples
are generated by solving the objective function provided in
Eq. 1 to obtain a lower bound on the adversarial perturbation
by using gradient-based methods. A prime example of local
search adversarial example crafting is the fast gradient sign
method (FGSM) where an adversarial example is created by
taking a step in the direction of the gradient [99]. In another
study, the authors demonstrated that adversarial images are
very easy to be constructed using evolutionary algorithms or
gradient ascent [100]. Combinatorial optimization is also a
method for creating adversarial examples where we find the
exact solution of the optimization problem provided in Eq.
1, a major shortcoming of this method is the increase in the
computational complexity with the increase of the number of
examples in the dataset. Recently, Khalil et al. [101] launched
a successful adversarial attack based on combinatorial and
integer programming on binarized neural networks but the
performance of the proposed attack reduces as the size and di-
mensions of data increase. Recently, convex relaxation is also
used to generate [102] and defend [103] against adversarial
examples where the upper bound on the objective function
provided in Eq. 1 is calculated.
3) Different Aspects of Perturbations: The adversarial ex-
amples are designed to look like the original ones and im-
perceptible to humans. In this regard, the addition of small
perturbations is of utmost importance. Whereas, the literature
suggests that even one-pixel perturbation is often sufficient to
fool the deep model trained for classification task [104]. Here
we analyze different aspects of adversarial perturbations.
(a) Perturbation Scope: Adversarial perturbations are gen-
erated from two aspects: (1) perturbations for each le-
gitimate input and (2) universal perturbations for the
complete datasets, i.e., for each original cleaned sample.
To date, most of the studies considered the first scope of
adversarial perturbations.
(b) Perturbation Limitation: Similarly, there are two types of
limitations, optimizing the system at a low perturbations
scale and optimizing the system at a low perturbations
scale with constrained optimization.
(c) The magnitude of the perturbations is mainly measured
using three norms L2, L∞, and L0 norm. In L2-norm-
based attacks, the attacker aims to minimize the squared
error between the original and adversarial example. L2-
norm measures the Euclidean distance between the ad-
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versarial example and the original sample and results in
a very small amount of noise added to the adversarial
sample. L∞ attacks are perhaps the simplest type of
attacks which aim to limit or minimize the extent to
which the maximum change for all pixels in adversarial
examples is achieved. Also, this constraint forces to only
make very small changes to each pixel. L0-norm-based
attacks work by minimizing the number of perturbed
pixels in an image and force the modifications only to
very few pixels.
To ensure tightly constrained action space available to an
adversary, imperceptibility of perturbations is important to
develop an attack. Considering the important constraints: (1)
what constraints are placed on the attacker’s “starting point”?
and (2) where did this initial example come from? Gilmer et al.
identified four salient features (described below) of adversarial
perturbations [105].
(a) Indistinguishable Perturbation: The attacker does not
have to select a starting point but it is given a draw from
the data distribution and introduces such perturbation in
the input sample that is indistinguishable by a human.
(b) Content-Preserving Perturbation: The attacker does not
have to select a starting point but it is given a draw from
the data distribution and creates such perturbation as long
as the original content of the sample is preserved.
(c) Non-suspicious Input: The attacker can generate any type
of desired perturbed input sample as long as it remains
undetectable to a human.
(d) Content-Constrained Input: The attacker can generate
any type of desired perturbed input sample as long
as it maintains some content payload, i.e., it must be
a picture of dog but not necessarily a particular dog.
This includes payload-constrained input, where human
perception might not be important. Rather, the intended
function of the input example remains intact.
(e) Unconstrained Input: There is no constraint on the input
and an attacker can produce any type of input example
to get the desired output or behavior from the system.
4) Adversarial ML Benchmarks: In this section, we de-
scribe the benchmarks datasets and victim ML models used
for evaluating adversarial examples. Researchers mostly adopt
an inconsistent approach and report the performance of the
attacks on diverse datasets and victim models. The widely used
benchmark datasets and victim models are described below.
• Datasets: MNIST [106], CIFAR-10 [107], and ImageNet
[108] are the widely used datasets in adversarial ML
research and are also regarded as the standard deep
learning datasets.
• Victim Models: The widely used victim ML/DL models
for evaluating adversarial examples are LeNet [106],
AlexNet [109], VGG [110], GoogLeNet [111], CaffeNet
[112], and ResNet [113].
B. Threat Models for Adversarial ML Attacks on CAVs
Threat modeling is the procedure of answering a few
common and straight forward questions related to the system
being developed or deployed from a hypothetical attacker’s
point of view. Threat modeling is a fundamental component of
security analysis. It requires that some fundamental questions
related to the threat are addressed [114]. In particular, a threat
model should identify:
• the system principals: what is the system and who are
the stakeholders?
• the system goals: what does the system intend to do?
• the system adversities: what potential bad things can hap-
pen due to adverse situations or motivated adversaries?
• the system invariants: what must be always true about the
system even if bad things happen?
The key goal of threat modeling is to optimize the security
of the system by determining security goals, identifying po-
tential threats, and vulnerabilities, and to develop countermea-
sures for preventing or mitigating their associated effects on
the system. Answering these questions requires careful logical
thoughts and significant expertise and time.
As the focus of this paper is on highlighting the potential
vulnerabilities of using ML techniques in CAVs, the scope of
our study is restricted to the adversarial ML threat in CAVs. In
the remainder of this section, we discuss the various facets of
the adversarial ML threat in CAVs (a taxonomy aggregating
these issues is illustrated in Figure 11).
1) Adversarial Attack Type: In the literature, the attacks on
learning systems are generally categorized into three dimen-
sions [115]:
(a) Influence: It includes causative (trying to get control
over training data) and exploratory (exploiting mis-
classifications of the model without affecting the training
process) attacks.
(b) Specificity: It involves targeted and indiscriminate attacks
on a specific instance.
(c) Security Violation: It is concerned with the integrity of
assets and availability of the service attack.
The first dimension describes the capabilities of the ad-
versary and whether the attacker has the ability to affect
the learning by poisoning training data. Instead, the attacker
exploits the model by sending new samples and observing
their responses to get the intended behavior. The second axis
indicates the specific intentions of the attacker, i.e., whether
the attacker is interested in realizing a targeted attack on one
particular sample or he aims to cause learned model t fail in an
indiscriminate fashion. The third dimension detail the types of
security violation an attacker can cause, e.g., the attacker may
aim to bypass harmful messages to bypass through the filter as
false negatives or realizing denial of service by causing benign
samples misclassified as false positives.
2) Adversarial Knowledge: Based on the adversarial
knowledge available to the adversaries, the adversarial ML
attacks are divided into three types; namely, white-box, gray-
box, and black-box attacks. White-box attacks assume com-
plete knowledge about the underlying ML model including
information about the optimization technique, the trained
ML model, model architecture, activation function, hyper-
parameters, layer weights, and training data. Gray-box attacks
assume a partial knowledge about the targeted model whereas
the black-box adversarial attack assumes the adversary has
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Fig. 11: The taxonomy of various types of threat models used in literature to design adversarial ML attacks. This figure also provides the information needed by a defender to
ensure the robustness of ML-based autonomous system.
zero knowledge and no access to the underlying ML model
and the training data. Black box attack refers to the real-
world knowledge where there is not much information about
the targeted ML/DL scheme is available. In such cases, the
adversary acts as a normal user and tries to infer from the
output of the ML system. Black-box adversarial attacks make
use of transferability property of adversarial examples where it
is assumed that adversarial examples created for one ML/DL
model will affect other models trained on datasets with a
similar distribution to that of the original model [116].
3) Adversarial Capabilities: Adversarial capabilities are
important to be identified in security practice. As they define
the strength of the adversaries to compromise the security
of the system. In general, an adversary can be stronger or
weaker based on the knowledge and access to the system.
Adversarial capabilities advocate how and what type of attacks
an adversary can realize using what type of attack vector on
which attack surface. The attacks can be launched at two
main phases; namely, inference and training. Inference time
attacks are exploratory attacks that do not modify the un-
derlying model. Instead they influence it to produce incorrect
outputs. Inference attacks vary with the availability of system
knowledge. The training time attacks aim at tampering with
the model itself or influence its learning process and involve
two types of attack methods [117]. In the first type, adversarial
examples are injected in the training data and in the second
type, training data is directly modified.
4) Adversarial Specificity: Another classification of the
adversarial attacks is based on the specificity of the adversarial
examples, where adversarial attacks are classified as targeted
and non-targeted attacks. The attacks where adversarial pertur-
bations are added to compromise the performance of a specific
class in the data are known as the targeted adversarial attacks.
Targeted adversarial attacks are launched by adversaries to
create targeted misclassification (i.e., a specific road sign will
be misclassified by the self-driving vehicle while the rest of
the road sign classification system will function correctly)
or source/target misclassification (i.e., a certain road traffic
sign will be always classified in a pre-determined wrong
class by the road sign classifier in a self-driving vehicle).
Whereas adversarial perturbations created for deteriorating the
performance of the model irrespective of any class of data
are known as non-targeted adversarial attacks. Non-targeted
attacks are launched by adversaries to reduce the classification
confidence (i.e., a traffic sign will be detected with less
accuracy which was previously detected with high accuracy)
and misclassification (i.e., a road traffic sign will be classified
in any other class than its original one).
5) Adversarial Falsification: The adversary can attempt
two types of falsification attacks; namely, false positive at-
tacks, and false negative attacks [15]. In the first attack, an ad-
versary generates a negative sample which can be misclassified
as a positive one. Let’s assume such attack has been launched
on the image classification system of an autonomous vehicle.
A false positive will be an adversarial image predicted to be
of a class with high confidence to whom it did not belong
and is unrecognizable to humans. On the contrary, while
attempting false negative attacks, the adversary generates a
positive sample which can be misclassified as a negative one.
In adversarial ML, this type of attack is referred to as an
evasion attack.
6) Attack Frequency: The adversarial attacks can be single
step or consist of an iterative optimization process. Compared
to single step attacks, iterative adversarial attacks are stronger;
however, they require frequent interactions for querying the
ML system and subsequently require a large amount of time
and computational resources for their efficient generation.
7) Adversarial Goals: The last component of the threat
modeling is the articulation of the adversary’s goals. The clas-
sical approach to model adversarial goals includes modeling of
the adversary’s desires to impact the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability (known as the CIA model) and a fourth, yet
important dimension is the privacy [117].
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TABLE IV: Summary of the state-of-the-art attacks
Year Authors Method Adversarial Knowledge Adversarial Specificity Perturbation Scope Perturbation Norm Attack Learning
2014 Szegedy et al. [13] L-BFGS White box Targeted Image specific L∞ One Shot
2015 Goodfellow et al. [99] FGSM White box Targeted Image specific L∞ One shot
2016 Kurakin et al. [118] BIM & ILCM White box Non targeted Image specific L∞ Iterative
2016 Papernot et al. [10] JSMA White box Targeted Image specific L0 Iterative
2016 Moosavi et al. [119] DeepFool White box Non targeted Image specific L2,L∞ Iterative
2017 Carlini et al. [120] C&W attacks White box Targeted Image specific L0,L2,L∞ Iterative
2017 Moosavi et al. [121] Uni. perturbations White box Non targeted Universal L2,L∞ Iterative
2017 Sarkar et al. [122] UPSET Black box Targeted Universal L∞ Iterative
2017 Sarkar et al. [122] ANGRI Black box Targeted Image specific L∞ Iterative
2017 Cisse et al. [123] Houdini Black box Targeted Image specific L2,L∞ Iterative
2018 Baluja et al. [124] ATNs White box Targeted Image specific L∞ Iterative
2019 Su et al. [104] One-pixel Black box Non Targeted Image specific L0 Iterative
C. Review of Existing Adversarial ML Attacks
1) Adversarial ML Attacks on Conventional ML Schemes:
A pioneering work on adversarial ML was performed by Dalvi
et al. [125] in 2004 where they proposed a minimum distance
evasion of the linear classifier and tested there proposed attack
on spam classification system highlighting the threat of adver-
sarial ML examples. A similar contribution was made by Lowd
et al. [126] in 2005 where they proposed adversarial classifier
reverse engineering technique for constructing an adversarial
attack on classification problems. In 2006, Barreno et al. [127]
discussed the security of ML in adversarial environments and
provided a taxonomy of attacks on ML schemes along with the
potential defenses against them. In 2010, Huang et al. [128]
provided the first consolidated review of adversarial ML where
they discussed the limitations on the classifiers and adversaries
in real-world settings. Biggio et al. [97] proposed poisoning
attack on Support Vector Machines (SVM) to increase the test
error in SVM, their attack successfully altered the test error
of SVM with linear and non-linear kernels. The same authors
also proposed an evasion attack where they used a gradient-
based approach for evading PDF malware detectors [98] and
tested their attack on SVM and simple neural networks.
2) Adversarial ML Attacks on DNNs: Adversarial ML
attacks on DNNs were first observed by Szegedy et al. [13]
where they demonstrated that DNNs can be fooled by mini-
mally perturbing their input images at test time, the proposed
attack was a gradient-based attack where minimum distance
based adversarial examples were crafted to fool the image
classifiers. Another gradient-based attack was proposed by
Goodfellow et al. [99]. In this attack, they formulated adversar-
ial ML as a min-max problem and adversarial examples were
produced by calculating the lower bound on the adversarial
perturbations. This method was termed as FGSM and is still
considered a very effective algorithm for creating adversarial
examples. Adversarial training was also introduced in the same
paper as a defensive mechanism against adversarial examples.
Kurakin et al. [118] highlighted the fragility of ML/DL
schemes in real-world settings using images taken from a
cell phone camera for adversarial example generation. The
adversarial samples were created by using the basic iterative
method (BIM) an extended version of FGSM. The resultant
adversarial examples were able to fool the state-of-art image
classifier. In [129], authors demonstrated that only rotation
and translation are sufficient for fooling state-of-the-art deep
learning based image classification models, i.e., convolutional
neural networks(CNNs). In a similar study [130], ten state-of-
the-art DNNs were shown to be fragile to the basic geometric
transformation, e.g., translation, rotation, and blurring. Liu et
al. presented a trojaning attack on neural networks that works
by modifying the neurons of the trained model instead of
affecting the training process [131]. Authors used trojan as
a backdoor to control the trojaned ML model as desired and
tested it on an autonomous vehicle. The car misbehaves when
a specific billboard (trojan trigger) is encountered by it on the
roadside.
Papernot et al. [10] exploited the mapping between the
input and output of DNNs to construct a white-box Jacobian
saliency-based adversarial attack (JSMA) scheme to fool the
DNN classifiers. The same authors also proposed another
defense against adversarial perturbations by using defensive
distillation. Defensive distillation is a training method in which
a model is trained to predict the classification probabilities
of another model which was trained on the baseline standard
to give more importance to accuracy. Papernot et al. [132]
also proposed a black-box adversarial ML attack where they
exploited the transferability property of adversarial examples
to fool the ML/DL classifiers. This black-box adversarial
attack was based on the substitute model training which not
only fools the ML/DL classifiers but also breaks the distillation
defensive mechanism. Carlini et al. [120] proposed a suite of
three adversarial attacks termed as C&W attacks on DNNs
by exploiting three distinct distance measures L1, L2, and
L∞. These attacks have not only evaded the DNN classifiers
but also evaded the defensive distillation successfully. This
demonstrated that defensive distillation is not an appropriate
method for building robustness. In another paper, Carlini et
al. [133] presented that the proposed adversarial attacks in
[120] have successfully evaded the ten well known defen-
sive schemes against adversarial examples. Right now these
attacks are also considered as state-of-art adversarial ML
attacks. Furthermore, Carlini et al. successfully demonstrated
an adversarial attack on speech recognition system by adding
small noise in the audio signal that forces the underlying ML
model to generate intended commands/text [134]. In [135],
an adversarial patch affixed to an original image forces the
deep model to mis-classify that image. Such universal targeted
patches fool classifiers without requiring knowledge of the
other items in the scene. Sich patches can be created offline
and then broadly shared. More details on adversarial ML
attacks can be found in [3], [4], [15], [16], [136], [137]. A
summary of different state-of-the-art adversarial perturbation
generation methods is provided in Table IV.
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TABLE V: Accidents caused by self-driving vehicles due to unintended adversarial conditions
Year Company Cause of the accident Damages System failure
2014 Hyundai Weather (Rain fall) Car crashed Camera object detection failure
2016 Google Waymo Speed estimation failure Car crashed in the bus Dynamic object movement detection failure
2016 Tesla Image classification and image contrast failure Car crashed in the neighboring truckand the driver was killed
Camera’s detection and
classification suite failure
2017 Uber Overreaction to an unseen event(Near by accident) Car crashed Lack of robustness in control system
2017 General Motors Stuck in a dilemma(Lane change decision reversal) Car knocked over a motorcyclist Coordination and state estimation failure
2018 Uber Confusion in the software decision systemand safety system failure Killed a person on the road Failure of planning and perception system
TABLE VI: Domains affected by adversarial machine learning (ML) and their applica-
tions
Domain Application Papers
Imaging
Digit Recognition [10], [99], [120], ...
Object Detection [120], [132], [102], ...
Traffic Signs Recognition [132], [12], [138], ...
Semantic Segmentation [139], [140], [141], ...
Reinforcement Learning [142], [143], [144], ...
Generative Modeling [145], [146], [147], ...
Text
Text Classification [148], [149], [150], ...
Sentiment Analysis [151], [150]
Reading Comprehension [152], [153]
Networking
Intrusion Detection [154], [155], [156], ...
Anomaly Detection [157], [158]
Malware Classification [159], [160], [161], ...
Traffic Classification [162], [163]
Audio Speech Recognition [134], [164], [123], ...
D. Adversarial ML attacks on CAVs
ML and DL act are core ingredients for performing many
key tasks in self-driving vehicles. Beyond providing deeply
embedded information for the decision making process within
the vehicle’s components, they also play an important role
in V2I and V2V, and V2X communications. As described in
earlier sections, ML/DL schemes are very vulnerable to small
carefully crafted adversarial perturbations. Self-driving vehi-
cles are also threatened by this security risk along with other
traditional security risks. Adversarial ML has affected many
application domains including imaging, text, networking, and
audio as highlighted in Table VI.
1) Autonomous Vehicles Accidents Due to Unintended Ad-
versarial Conditions: The autonomous vehicles developed so
far are not robust to unintended adversarial conditions and
there have been few reported fatalities caused by the malfunc-
tioning of DNN-based autonomous vehicles where adversarial
examples were unintentionally created by the DNN operating
the autonomous vehicle. In 2014, during Hyundai competition,
an autonomous vehicle crashed because of a sensor failure due
to shifting in the angle of the car and direction of the sun2.
Another incident was reported in 2016 where a Tesla autopilot
was not able to handle the image contrast which resulted in
the death of the driver3. It was also reported that the Tesla
autopilot unable to differentiate between the bright sky and a
white truck which resulted in a horrible accident. A similar
accident happened to Google self-driving car where the car
was unable to estimate the relative speed which resulted in a
collision with a bus4. In 2018 Uber self-driving car also faced
2https://bit.ly/2SWLxUY
3https://cnnmon.ie/2VOB283
4https://bit.ly/1U0O6yx
an accident due to malfunctioning in the DNN-based system
which resulted in a pedestrian fatality5. Table V provides a
detailed description of accidents caused by malfunctions in
different components of self-driving vehicles.
2) Physical World Attacks on Autonomous Vehicles: Aung
et al. [165] used FGSM and JSMA schemes to generate
adversarial traffic signs to successfully evade the DNN-based
traffic sign detection schemes to highlight the problem of
adversarial examples in autonomous driving. Sitawarin et al.
[138] proposed a real-world adversarial ML attack by altering
the traffic signs and logos with adversarial perturbations while
keeping the visual perception of the traffic and logo signs. In
another work, Sitawarin et al. [12] proposed a technique for
generating out-of-distribution adversarial examples to perform
an evasion attack on ML-based sign recognition system of
autonomous vehicles. They also proposed a Lenticular printing
attack where they exploited the camera height in autonomous
vehicles to create an illusion of false traffic signs in the
physical environment to fool the sign recognition system of
autonomous vehicles.
Object detection is another integral part of the perception
module of autonomous vehicles where state-of-the-art DNN-
based schemes such as Mask R-CNN [166] and YOLO [167]
are used for object detection. Zhang et al. [168] proposed a
camouflage physical world adversarial attack by approximately
imitating how a simulator applies camouflage to the vehicle
and then minimized the approximated detection score by using
local search for optimal camouflage. The proposed adversarial
attack successfully fooled image-based object detection sys-
tems. Another physical world adversarial example generation
scheme on object detection is performed by Song et al. [169]
where the perturbed “STOP” sign remained hidden from the
state-of-art object detectors like Mask R-CNN and YOLO.
They produced adversarial perturbations by the robust physical
perturbations (RP2) [170] algorithm. Recently Zhou et al.
[171] proposed DeepBillboard a systematic way for generating
adversarial advertisement billboards to inject a malfunction in
the steering angle of the autonomous vehicle. The proposed
adversarial billboard misled the average steering angle by
26.44 degrees. Table VII provides a summary of state-of-the-
art adversarial attacks on self-driving vehicles. In a recent
study [172], imitation learning has been shown robust enough
for autonomous vehicles to drive in a realistic environment.
Authors proposed a model named ChauffeurNet that learns to
drive the vehicle by imitating best and synthesizing worst.
5https://bit.ly/2SWmb9N
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TABLE VII: Adversarial attacks on self-driving vehicles: summary of state-of-the-art
Attack Objective Specific work Problem formulation Data Threat model Attack results
Perception system
failure
DARTS [12]: Traffic signs
manipulation
Generating adversarial examples for
CNN-based traffic sign detection by
performing out-of-distribution attacks
along with Lenticular printing.
GTSRB
GTSDB
1) Virtual and physical world attack
2) White and black-box mode
DARTS has successfully
fooled the perception system
of self-driving car.
Perception system
failure
Rogue Signs [138]: Traffic signs
and logos manipulation
End-to-end pipeline for adversarial
example generation for CNN-based
traffic signs and logo detection.
GTSRB 1) Virtual and physical world attack2) White-box mode
Fooled the perception system
of self-driving car with a success
rate of 99.7%.
Object detection
failure
ShapeShifter [173]: Adversarial
attack on Faster R-CNN
Adversarial attack on bounding boxes
of Faster R-CNN by using expectation
over transformation techniques.
MS-COCO 1) Virtual and physical world attack2) White-box mode
Caused malfunction in Faster
R-CNN of self-driving car
with 93% success.
Motion planning and
perception system
failure
DeepBillboard [171]: Adversarial
attack through drive-by
billboards.
Adversarial attack on steering angle
of the self-driving car by using adversarial
perturbations in drive-by billboards.
1) Udacity self-driving
car challenge dataset
2) Dave testing dataset
3) Kitti dataset
1) Virtual and physical world attack
2) White and black-box mode
Caused a 23 degree malfunction
in steering angle of
self-driving car.
Object detection
failure
CAMOU [168]: Adversarial
camouflage to fool the
object detector
Generating adversarial perturbation
to prevent the self-driving car from
Mask R-CNN-based object detector.
Unreal engine
simulator
1) Virtual and physical world attack
2) White and black-box mode
Caused a 32.74% drop
in the performance of
Mask R-CNN.
Object detection
failure
Song et al. [169]: Object
disappearance and
creation attack
Generating adversarial perturbation
based stickers where object detection
schemes like Yolo and R-CNN used
in self-driving cars fails to recognize
certain signs and logos. Furthermore
object detection schemes start
detecting things that are not present
in the frame.
Video of traffic signs 1) Virtual and physical world attack2) White-box mode
The object detection schemes
fails to recognize traffic signs
nearly in 86% of the frames in
the video.
Perception system
failure
Eykholt et al. [170]: Robust
physical perturbations
against visual classification
under different physical
environment.
Robust physical perturbations are
created to fool LISA-CNN and
GTSRB-CNN based traffic sign
classification schemes.
1) LISA
2) GTSRB
1) Virtual and physical world attack
2) White and black-box mode
In few cases caused 100%
performance drop in visual
classification of traffic signs
Perception and
controller system
failure
Tuncali et al. [174]: Simulation
based adversarial test
generation for self-driving
cars.
Testing and verifying self-driving
car’s perception and controller
system against adversarial examples.
Simulated data
from proposed
simulator
1) Virtual environment
2) White and black-box mode
Designed system was able
to detect critical cases in
autonomous car’s perception
and control.
Controller system
failure
Yaghoubi et al. [175]: Finding
gray-box adversarial examples
for closed loop autonomous
cars control system.
Testing the controller and perception
system of self-driving cars against
gradient-based gray-box adversarial
examples.
Simulated data 1) Virtual environment2) Gray box mode
Gray-box adversarial examples
have outperformed simulated
Annealing optimization in
a dummy control system
problem.
End-to-end
autonomous control
failure
Boloor et al. [176]: Physical
adversarial examples
against E2E driving
models.
Disrupting steering by using physical
perturbation in the environment.
CARLA simulated
data
1) Virtual environment
2) White-box mode
Physical adversarial
perturbation has forced the
self-driving car to crash.
V. TOWARDS DEVELOPING ADVERSARIALLY ROBUST ML
SOLUTIONS
As discussed above, despite the outstanding performance
of ML techniques in many settings, including human level
accuracy at recognizing images. These techniques exhibit strict
vulnerability to carefully crafted adversarial examples. In this
section, we present an outline of approaches for developing
adversarially robust ML solutions. We define the robustness as
the ability of the ML model to restrain adversarial examples.
In the literature, defenses against adversarial attacks have
been divided into two broad categories: (1) reactive detect
adversarial observations (input) after deep models are trained;
and (2) proactive make the deep model robust against adver-
sarial examples before the attack.
Alternatively, these techniques can also be broadly divided
into three categories: (1) modifying data; (2) adding auxiliary
models; and (3) modifying models. The reader is referred to
Figure 12 for a visual depiction of a taxonomy of robust
ML solutions in which various techniques that fall in these
categories are also listed. These categories are detailed next.
A. Modifying Data
The methods falling under this category mainly deal with
modification of either the training data (e.g., adversarial re-
training) and its features or test data (e.g., data pre-processing).
Widely used approaches that utilize such methods are de-
scribed below.
1) Adversarial (Re-)training: The training with adversarial
examples has been firstly proposed by Goodfellow et al. [99]
and Huang et al. [177] as a defense strategy to make deep
neural networks (DNNs) robust against adversarial attacks.
They trained the model by augmenting adversarial examples
in the training set. Furthermore, Goodfellow et al. showed
that adversarial training could provide better regularization for
DNNs. In [99], [177], the adversarial robustness of ML models
was evaluated on the MNIST dataset having 10 classes while
in [178], a comprehensive evaluation of adversarial training
was performed on a considerably large dataset, i.e., ImageNet
having 1000 classes. The authors used 50% of the dataset for
adversarial training and this strategy increased the robustness
of DNNs for single step adversarial attack (e.g., FGSM [99]).
However, the strategy failed for iterative adversarial examples
generation methods such as the basic iterative method (BIM)
[118].
2) Input Reconstruction: The idea of input reconstruction
is to clean the adversarial examples to transform them back
to legitimate ones. Once the adversarial examples have been
transformed, they will not affect the prediction of DNN mod-
els. For robustifying DNN, a technique named deep contractive
autoencoder has been proposed in [179]. They trained a
denoising autoencoder for cleaning adversarial perturbations.
3) Feature Squeezing: Xu et al. [180] leveraged the ob-
servation that input feature spaces are typically unnecessarily
large and provide a vast room for an adversary to construct ad-
versarial perturbations and thereby proposed feature squeezing
as a defense strategy to adversarial examples. The available
feature space to an adversary can be reduced using feature
squeezing that combines samples having heterogeneous feature
vectors in the original space into a single space. They perform
feature squeezing at two levels: (1) reducing color bit depth;
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Fig. 12: Taxonomy of robust machine learning (ML) methods categorized into three classes: (1) Modifying Data (2) Adding Auxiliary Model(s) and (3) Modifying Models.
(2) spatial domain smoothing using both local and non-local
method. Also, they evaluated eleven state-of-the-art adversarial
perturbations generation methods on three different datasets,
i.e., MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet. However, this defense
strategy was found to be less effective in a later study [181].
4) Features Masking: In [182], authors proposed to add
a masking layer before the softmax layer of the classifier
that is mainly responsible for the classification task. The
purpose of adding the masking layer was to mask the most
sensitive features of input that are more prone to adversarial
perturbations by forcing the corresponding weights of this
layer to zero.
5) Developing Adversarially Robust Features: This method
has been recently proposed as an effective approach to make
DNNs resilient against adversarial attacks [183]. Authors
leveraged the connections between the natural spectral ge-
ometrical property of the dataset and the metric of interest
for developing adversarially robust features. They empirically
demonstrated that the spectral approach can be effectively used
to generate adversarially robust features that can be ultimately
used to develop robust models.
6) Manifold Projection: In this method, input examples are
projected on the manifold of learned data from another ML
model, generally, the manifold is provided by a generative
model. For instance, Song et al. [184] leveraged generative
models to clean the adversarial perturbations from malicious
images and then the cleaned images are given to the non-
modified ML model. Furthermore, this paper ascertains that
regardless of the attack type and targeted model, the ad-
versarial examples lie in the low probability regions of the
training data distribution. In a similar study [185], authors
used generative adversarial networks (GANs) for cleaning
adversarial perturbations. Similarly, Meng et al. proposed a
framework named MagNet that includes one or more detectors
and a reformer network [186]. The detector network is used
to classify normal and adversarial examples by learning the
manifold of normal examples, whereas, the reformer network
moves adversarial examples towards the learned manifold.
B. Modifying Model
The methods that fall in this category mainly modify the
parameters/features learned by the trained model (e.g., defen-
sive distillation), a few prominent such methods are described
next.
1) Network Distillation: Papernot et al. [187] adopted net-
work distillation as a procedure to defend against adversarial
attacks. The notion of distillation was originally proposed by
Hinton et al. [188] as a mechanism for effectively transferring
19
knowledge from a larger network to a smaller one. The defense
method developed by Papernot et al. uses the probability
distribution vector generated by the first model as an input
to the original DNN model. This increases the resilience of
the DNN model towards very small perturbations. However,
Carlini et al. showed that the defensive distillation method
does not work against their proposed attack [133].
2) Network Verification: Network verification aims to ver-
ify the properties of DNN, i.e., whether an input satisfies or
violates certain property because it may restrain new unseen
adversarial perturbations. For instance, a network verification
method for robustifying DNN models using ReLU activation
is presented in [178]. To verify the properties of the deep
model, the authors used the satisfiability modulo theory (SMT)
solver and showed that the network verification problem is
NP-complete. The assumption of using ReLU with certain
modifications is addressed in [189].
3) Gradient Regularization: Ross et al. [190] proposed
using input gradient regularization as a defense strategy against
adversarial attacks. In the proposed approach, they used differ-
entiable DNN models and penalized the variation that results
in the output with a change in the input. As a result, adversarial
examples with small perturbations were unlikely to modify
the output of deep models but this increases the training
complexity with a factor of two. The notion of penalizing the
gradient of loss function of models with respect to the inputs
for robustification has been already been investigated in [191].
4) Classifier Robustifying: In this method, classification
models that are robust to adversarial attacks are designed
from the ground up instead of detecting or transforming them.
Bradshaw et al. [192] utilized the uncertainty around the
adversarial examples and developed a hybrid model using
Gaussian processes (GPs) with RBF kernels on top of DNNs
and showed that their approach is robust against adversarial at-
tacks. The latent variable in GPs is expressed using a Gaussian
distribution and is parameterized by mean and covariance and
encoded with RBF kernels. Schott et al. [193] proposed the
first adversarially robust classifier for MNIST dataset, where
robustness is achieved by using analysis by synthesis through
learned class-conditional data distribution. This work high-
lights the lack of research that provides guaranteed robustness
against adversarial attacks.
5) Explainable and Interpretable ML: In a recent study
[194], an adversarial example detection approach is presented
for a face recognition task that leverages the interpretability
of DNN models. The key in this approach is the identification
of critical neurons for an individual task that is performed by
establishing a bi-directional correspondence inference between
the neurons of a DNN model and its attributes. Then the
activation values of these neurons are amplified to augment the
reasoning part and the values of other neurons are decreased
to conceal the uninterpretable part. Recently, Nicholas Carlini
showed that this approach does not defend against untargeted
adversarial perturbations generated using L∞ norm with a
bound of 0.01 [195].
6) Masking ML Model: In a recent study [196], authors
formulated the problem of adversarial ML as learning and
masking problem and presented a classifier masking method
for secure learning. To mask the deep model, they introduced
noise in the DNN’s logit output that was able to defend against
low distortion attacks.
C. Adding Auxiliary Model(s)
These methods aim to utilize additional ML models to en-
hance the robustness of the main model (e.g., using generative
models for adversarial detection), such widely used methods
are described as follows.
1) Adversarial Detection: In adversarial detection strategy,
a binary classifier (detector) is trained, e.g., DNN to identify
the input as a legitimate or an adversarial one [197], [198]. In
[199], authors used a simple DNN-based binary adversarial
detector as an auxiliary network to the main model. In a
similar study [200], authors introduced an outlier class while
training the DNN model, the model then detects the adversarial
examples by classifying them as an outlier. This defense
approach has been used in a number of studies in the literature.
2) Ensembling Defenses: As adversarial examples can be
developed in a multi-facet fashion, therefore, multiple defense
methods can be combined together (parallelly or sequentially)
to defend against them [201]. PixelDefend [184] is a prime
example of ensemble defense in which an adversarial detector
and an “input reconstructor” are integrated to restrain adver-
sarial examples. However, He et al. showed that an ensemble
of weak defense strategies does not provide a strong defense
to adversarial attacks [181]. Further, they demonstrated that
adaptive adversarial examples transfer across several defense
or detection proposals.
3) Using Generative ML Models: Goodfellow et al. [99]
firstly coined the idea of using generative training to defend
adversarial attacks, however, in the same study they argued that
being generative is not sufficient and presented an alternative
hypothesis of ensemble training that works by ensembling
multiple instances of original DNN models. In [202], an
approach named cowboy is presented to detect and defend
against adversarial examples. They transformed adversarial
samples back to data manifold by cleaning them using a GAN
trained on the same dataset. Furthermore, authors empirically
showed that adversarial examples lie outside the data man-
ifold learned by the GAN, i.e., the discriminator of GAN
consistently scores the adversarial perturbations lower than the
real samples across multiple attacks and datasets. In another
similar study [203], a GAN-based framework named Defense-
GAN is trained for modeling the distribution of legitimate
images. During inference time, Defense-GAN finds a similar
output without adversarial perturbations that is then fed to the
original classifier. Also, the authors of both of these studies
claimed that their method is independent of the DNN model
and attack type and that it can be used in existing settings.
The summary of various state-of-the-art adversarial defense
studies is presented in Table VIII.
D. Adversarial Defense Evaluation: Methods and Recommen-
dations
This section presents different potential methods for per-
forming the evaluation of adversarial defenses along with an
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TABLE VIII: Summary of state-of-the-art adversarial defense approaches
Reference Type Defense Adv. Perturbation Dataset Threat
Model
Original
Accuracy
Adversarial
Accuracy
Defense Success
Gu et al.
[179]
Modifying
Data
Adversarial examples
cleaning using denoising
autoencoders (DAEs).
Local perturbations, e.g.,
additive Gaussian noise.
MNIST Not clearly
articulated
99 (%) 100 (%) 99.1%
Xu et al.
[180]
Reduced the feature
space available to an
adversary.
Evaluated different state
of the art perturbation
generation methods.
MNIST,
CIFAR-10,
and ImageNet
White Box MNIST
(99.43%),
CIFAR-10
(94.84%),
and
ImageNet
(68.36%)
Roughly
achieved
100%
for each
model using
different
attack
algorithms.
MNIST (62.7%),
CIFAR-10 (77.27%),
and ImageNet
(68.11%)
Gao et al.
[182]
Proposed DeepCloak
that removes
unnecessary features
in the model.
Perturbations are gener-
ated using FGSM.
CIFAR-10 Not clearly
articulated
93.72%
(1%
masking)
39.23% (1%
masking)
10% increase in ad-
versarial settings
Garg et al.
[183]
Constructed
adversarially robust
features using spectral
property of the dataset.
L2 Perturbations MNIST Not clearly
articulated
Not clearly
articulated
Not clearly
articulated
Provided empirical
evidence for the
effectiveness of the
proposed defense.
Song et al.
[184]
Proposed PixelDefend to
clean adversarial exam-
ples by moving them
back to the manifold of
original training data.
Used five state of the art
adversarial attacks.
Fashion MNIST
and CIFAR-10
White Box 90% Fashion
MNIST
(63%),
CIFAR-10
(32%) for
strongest
defense.
Adversarial accuracy
increased from 63%
to 84% for Fashion
MNIST and 32% to
70% for CIFAR-10.
Prakash et
al. [204]
Used wavelet-based de-
noising method to clean
natural and adversarial
noise.
Generated perturbations
using pixel deflection
L2( = 0.05).
ImageNet White Box 98.9% Not clearly
articulated
81% accuracy
Xie et al.
[205]
Proposed to use random-
ization at inference stage
and used random resiz-
ing and random padding.
L∞( = 10/255) ImageNet White Box
and Black
Box
99.2% Not clearly
articulated
86% accuracy
Guo et al.
[206]
Investigated different im-
age transformation meth-
ods defending adversar-
ial attacks.
L2( = 0.06) ImageNet Gray Box
and Black
Box
75% Not clearly
articulated
70% accuracy
Goodfellow
et al. [99]
Augmented adversarial
examples into the
training set.
Fast Gradient Sign
(FGSM) method
MNIST Not clearly
articulated
Not clearly
articulated
99.9% With adversarial
training, the error rate
fell to 17.9%
Schott et
al. [193]
Adding
Auxiliary
Model
Used generative mod-
elling using variational
autoencoder (VAE.)
Applied score-based,
decision-based, transfer-
based, and gradient-
based attacks using
L2( = 1.5).
MNIST Not clearly
articulated
99% Not clearly
articulated
80%
Wong et
al. [103]
Formulated a robust op-
timization problem using
convex outer approxima-
tion for detection of ad-
versarial examples.
FGSM and gradient
descent based methods,
L∞( = 0.1).
MNIST Not clearly
articulated
98.2% ac-
curacy
Not clearly
articulated
94.2% accuracy
Liao et al.
[207]
Proposed a high-level
representation guided de-
noiser (HGD) for de-
fending adversarial at-
tacks.
L∞( = 4/255) ImageNet White Box
and Black
Box
75% Not clearly
articulated
75% accuracy
Ross et al.
[190]
Modifying
Model
Trained the model with
input gradient regulariza-
tion for defending adver-
sarial attacks.
Evaluated three famous
attacks, i.e., FGSM,
TGSM, and JSMA.
MNIST, Street-
View House
Numbers
(SVHN), and
notMNIST
White Box
and Black
Box
Not clearly
articulated
Not clearly
articulated
MNIST (100%),
SVHN (∼90%), and
notMNIST (100%)-
approximately same
for each type of
attack.
Madry et
al. [208]
Trained the model with
optimized parameters us-
ing robust optimization.
L∞( = 8/255) CIFAR-10 White Box
and Weaker
Black Box
87% Not clearly
articulated
46% accuracy
Buckman
et al. [209]
Proposed to use ther-
mometer encoding for
inputs.
L∞( = 8/255) CIFAR-10 White Box 90% Not clearly
articulated
79% accuracy
Dhillon et
al. [210]
Proposed stochastic ac-
tivation pruning of the
trained model for de-
fense.
L∞( = 4/255) CIFAR-10 Not clearly
articulated
83% Not clearly
articulated
51% accuracy
Croce et
al. [211]
Proposed a regulariza-
tion scheme for ReLU
networks
Perturbations using L2
and L∞ methods.
MNIST,
German
Traffic Signs
(GTS), Fashion
MNIST, and
CIFAR-10.
Not clearly
articulated
98.81% Not clearly
articulated
96.4% accuracy (on
first 1000 test points)
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Fig. 13: The taxonomy of different adversarial defense evaluation methods and recom-
mendations.
outline of common evaluation recommendations, as depicted
in Figure 13.
1) Principles for Performing Defense Evaluations: In a
recent study [212], Carlini et al. provided recommendations
for evaluating adversarial defenses and thereby provided three
common reasons to evaluate the performance of adversarial
defenses. These recommendations are briefly described below.
a) Defending Against the Adversary: Defending against
adversaries attempting adversarial attacks on the system is
crucial as it is a matter of security concern. In real-world
applications, if the ML-based systems are deployed without
considering the security threats then the adversaries willing to
harm the system will continue to practice attacking the system
as long as there are incentives. The nature and sovereignty
of attacks vary with adversarial capabilities and knowledge,
etc. In this regard, proper and well-thought threat modeling
(described in detail in an earlier section) is of paramount
importance.
b) Testing Worst-Case Robustness: In real-world set-
tings, testing the worst-case robustness of ML models from
the perspective of an adversary is crucial as real-world systems
exhibit randomness that is hard to be predicted. Compared
to the random testing approach, worst-case analysis can be a
powerful tool to distinguish a system that fails one time in
a billion trials from a system that never fails. For instance,
if a powerful adversary who is attempting to harm a system
to get intentional misbehavior fails to do so, then it provides
strong evidence that the system will not misbehave in case of
previously unforeseen randomness.
c) Measuring Progress of ML Towards Human Level
Abilities: To advance ML techniques, it is important to un-
derstand why ML algorithms fail in a particular setting. In
the literature, we see that the performance gap between ML
methods and humans is considerably small on many complex
tasks, e.g., natural image classification [109], mastering the
game of Go using reinforcement learning [213], and human
level accuracy in the medical domain [214], [215]. However,
in case of evaluating adversarial robustness, the performance
gap between humans and ML systems is very large. This is
so true for the cases where ML models exhibit super-human
accuracy, i.e., an adversarial attack can completely evade the
prediction performance of the system. This leads to the belief
that there exists a fundamental difference between the decision
making process of humans and ML models. So, keeping this
aspect in mind, adversarial robustness is the measure of ML
progress that is orthogonal to performance.
2) Common Evaluation Recommendations: In this section,
we provide a brief discussion on the common evaluation
recommendations and we refer interested readers to the recent
article of Carlini et al. [212] for a detailed and comprehensive
description on evaluation recommendations and pitfalls for
adversarial robustness. As authors promised to update this
paper timely, therefore, we also refer interested readers to
following URL6 for an updated version of this paper. To avoid
unintended consequences and pitfalls of evaluation methods,
the following evaluation recommendations can be adopted.
a) Use Both Targeted and Untargeted Attacks: Adver-
sarial robustness should be evaluated on both targeted and
untargeted attacks. In any case, it is important to explicitly
state which attack were considered while evaluating. The-
oretically, an untargeted attack is considered to be strictly
easier than a targeted attack but practically, performing an
untargeted attack can give better results than targeting any
of N − 1 classes. Many untargeted attacks mainly work by
minimizing the prediction confidence of the correct label.
Contrarily, targeted attacks work by maximizing the prediction
confidence of some other class.
b) Perform Ablation: Perform ablation analysis by re-
moving a combination of defense components and verifying
that the attack succeeds on a similar but undefended model.
This is useful to develop a straight forward understanding
of the goals of the evaluation and assess the effectiveness
of combining multiple defense strategies for robustifying the
model.
c) Diverse Test Settings: Perform the evaluation in di-
verse settings, i.e., test the robustness to random noise, validate
broader threat models, and carefully evaluate the attack hyper-
parameters and select those that provide the best performance.
It is also important to verify that the attack converges under
selected hyperparameters. Also, investigate whether attack
results are sensitive to a specific set of hyperparameters. In
addition, experiment witg at least one hard label attack and
one gradient free attack.
d) Evaluate Defense on Broader Domains: For a defense
to be truly effective, consider evaluating the proposed defense
method on broader domains other than images. For instance,
the majority of works on adversarial machine learning mainly
investigate the imaging domain. State explicitly if the defense
is only capable of defending adversarial perturbations in a
specific domain (e.g., images).
e) Ensemble Over Randomness: It is important to create
adversarial examples by ensembling over the randomness of
those defenses that randomize aspects of DNN inference. The
introduced randomness enforces stochasticity and standard at-
tacks become hard to be realized. Verify that the attack remains
6https://github.com/evaluating-adversarial-robustness/adv-eval-paper
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successful when randomness is assigned a fixed value. Also,
define the threat model and the availability of randomness
knowledge to the adversary.
f) Transferability Attack: Select a similar substitute
model (to the defended model) and perform transferability
of the attack. Because the adversarial examples are often
transferable across different models, i.e., an adversarial sample
constructed for one model often appears adversarial to another
model with identical architecture [216]. This is true regardless
of the fact that the other model is trained on completely
different data distribution.
g) Upper Bound of Robustness: To provide upper bound
on robustness, apply adaptive attacks, i.e., give access to a full
defense. Apply the strongest attack for a given threat model
and defense being evaluated. Also, verify that adaptive attacks
perform better than others and evaluate their performance in
multiple settings, e.g., the combination of transfer, random-
noise, and black-box attacks. For instance, Ruan et al. eval-
uated the robustness of DNN and presented an approximate
approach to provide lower and upper bounds on robustness for
L0 norm with provable guarantees [217].
E. Testing of ML Models and Autonomous Vehicles
1) Behavior Testing of Models: In a recent study, Sun et
al. proposed four novel testing criteria for verifying structural
features of DNN using MC/DC7 coverage criteria [218]. They
validated proposed methods by generating test cases guided
by their proposed coverage criteria using both symbolic and
gradient-based approach and showed that their method was
able to capture undesired behaviors of DNN. Similarly, a
set of multi-granularity testing criteria named DeepGauge is
presented in [219] that works by rendering a multi-faceted
testbed. The security analysis of neural networks based system
using symbolic intervals is presented in [220] which uses
interval arithmetics and symbolic intervals together with other
optimization methods to minimize confidence bound of over-
estimation of outputs. A coverage guided fuzzing method
for testing neural networks for goals (e.g., finding numerical
errors, generating disagreements, and determining the undesir-
able behavior of models) is presented in [221]. In [222], the
first approach utilizing differential fuzzing testing is presented
for exploiting incorrect behavior of DL systems.
2) Automated Testing of ML Empowered Autonomous Ve-
hicles: An Overview: To ensure a completely secure func-
tionality of autonomous vehicles in a real-world environment,
the development of automated testing tools is required. As
the backbone of autonomous vehicles leverage different ML
techniques for building decision systems at different levels,
e.g., perception, decision making, and control, etc. In this
section, we provide an overview of various studies performing
test of autonomous vehicles.
Tian et al. [223] proposed and investigated a tool named
DeepTest to perform testing of DNN empowered autonomous
vehicles to automatically detect erroneous behaviors of the
7MC/DC (Modified Condition/Decision Coverage) is a method of measur-
ing the extent to which safety-critical software has been adequately tested.
vehicle that can potentially cause fatal accidents. Their pro-
posed tool automatically generates test cases using changes in
real-world road conditions such as weather and lighting con-
ditions and then systematically explores different components
of DNN logic that maximize the number of activated neurons.
Furthermore, they tested three DNNs that won top positions
in Udacity self-driving car challenge and found various erro-
neous behaviors in different real-world road conditions (e.g.,
rain, fog, blurring, etc.) that led to fatal accidents. In [224],
used a GAN-based approach to generate synthetic scenes of
different driving conditions for testing autonomous cars. A
metamorphic testing approach for evaluating the software part
of self-driving vehicles is presented in [225].
A generic framework for testing security and robustness
of ML models for computer vision systems depicting real-
istic properties is presented in [130]. Authors evaluated the
security of fifteen state of the art computer vision systems
in black box setting including Nvidia’s Dave self-driving
system. Moreover, it has been provably demonstrated that
there exists a trade-off between adversarial robustness to
perturbations and the standard accuracy of the model in a
fairly simple and natural setting [226]. A simulation-based
framework for generating adversarial test cases to evaluate the
closed-loop properties of ML enabled autonomous vehicles
is presented in [174]. In [227], authors generated adversarial
driving scenes using Bayesian optimization to improve self-
driving behavior utilizing vision-based imitation learning. An
autoencoder-based approach for automatic identification of
unusual events using small dashcam video and the inertial
sensor is presented in [228] that can potentially be used to
develop a robust autonomous driving system. Various factors
and challenges impacting driveability of autonomous vehicles
along with an overview of available datasets for training self-
driving is presented in [229] and challenges in designing such
datasets are described in [230]. Furthermore, Dreossi et al.
suggested that while robustifying the ML systems, the effect of
adversarial ML should be studied by considering the semantics
and context of the whole system [231]. For example, in DL
empowered autonomous vehicle, not every adversarial obser-
vation might lead to harmful action(s). Moreover, one might be
interested in those adversarial examples that can significantly
modify the desired semantics of the whole system.
VI. OPEN RESEARCH ISSUES
The advancement of ML research and its state of the art
performance in various complex domains, in particular, the
advent of more sophisticated DL methods might be an inherent
panacea to the conventional challenges of vehicular networks.
However, ML/DL methods cannot be naively applied to vehic-
ular networks that possess unique characteristics and adaption
of these methods for learning such distinguishing features of
vehicular networks is a challenging task [232]. In this section,
we highlight a few promising areas of research that require
further investigation.
A. Efficient Distributed Data Storage
In the connected vehicular ecosystem, the data is generated
and stored in a distributed fashion that raises a question about
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the applicability of ML/DL models at a global level. As ML
models are developed with the assumption that data is easily
accessible and managed by a central entity, there is a need to
utilize distributed learning methods for connected vehicles so
that data may be scalably acquired from multiple units in the
ecosystem.
B. Interpretable ML
Another major security vulnerability in CAVs is the lack
of interpretability of ML schemes. ML techniques in general
and DL techniques specifically are based on the idea of
function approximation, where the approximation of the em-
pirical function is performed using DNN architectures. Current
works in ML/DL lack interpretability, which is resulting in a
major hurdle in the progress of ML/DL empowered CAVs.
The lack of interpretability is exploited by the adversaries
to construct adversarial examples for fooling the deployed
ML/DL schemes in autonomous vehicles, i.e., physical attacks
on self-driving vehicles as discussed above. Development
of secure, explainable, and interpretable ML techniques for
security-critical applications of CAVs is another open research
issue.
C. Defensive and Secure ML
Despite many defense proposals presented in the literature
for adversarial attacks, developing adversarially robust ML
models remains yet another open research problem. Almost
every defense has been shown to be only effective for a
specific attack type and fails for stronger or unseen attacks.
Moreover, most defenses address the problem of adversarial
attacks for computer vision tasks but adversarial ML is be-
ing developed for many other vertical application domains.
Therefore, development of efficient and effective novel defense
strategies is essentially required, particularly, for safety-critical
applications, e.g., communication between connected vehicles.
D. Privacy Preserving ML
Preserving privacy in any user-centric application is of
high concern. Privacy means that models should not reveal
any additional information about the subjects involved in
collected training data (a.k.a. differential privacy) [233]. As
CAVs involve human subjects, ML model learning should be
capable of preserving the privacy of drivers, passengers, and
pedestrians where privacy breaches can results in extremely
harmful consequences.
E. Security Centric Proxy Metrics
Development of security-centric proxy metrics to evaluate
security threats against systems is fundamentally important.
Currently, there is no way to formalize different types of
perturbation properties, e.g., indistinguishable and content-
preserving, etc. In addition, there is no function to determine
that a specific transformation is content-preserving. Similarly,
the process of measuring perceptual similarity between two
images is very complex and widely used perceptual metrics
are shallow functions that fail to account for many subtle
distinctions of human perception [234].
F. Fair and Accountable ML
The literature on ML reveals that ML-based results and
predictions lack fairness and accountability. The fairness prop-
erty ensures that the ML model did not nurture discrimination
against specific cases, e.g., favoring cyclists over pedestrians.
This bias in ML predictions is introduced by the biased
training data and results in social bias and higher error rate
for a particular demographic group. For example, researchers
identified a risk of bias in the perception system of au-
tonomous vehicles to recognize pedestrians with dark skin
[235]. This is an experimental work in which authors evaluated
different models developed by other academic researchers for
autonomous vehicles. Despite the fact that this work does not
use an actual object detection model that is being used by
autonomous vehicles in the market, nor did it use the training
data being used by autonomous vehicle manufactures, this
study highlights a major vulnerability of ML models used
in autonomous vehicles and raises serious concerns about
their applicability in real-world settings where a self-driving
vehicle may encounter people from a variety of demographic
backgrounds.
The accountability of ML models is associated with their
interpretability property as we are interested in developing
such models that can explain their predictions using the
models’ internal parameters. The notion of accountability is
fundamentally important to understand ML model failures for
adversarial examples.
G. Robustifying ML Models Against Distribution Drifts
To restrict the integrity attacks, ML models should be made
robust against distribution drifts which refer to the situation
where train and test data distributions are different. This dif-
ference between the training and test distributions gives rise to
adversarial examples. These examples can also be considered
as the worst case distribution drifts [117]. It is fairly clear
that the data collection process in the vehicular ecosystem is
temporal and dynamic in nature so such distribution drifts are
highly possible and will affect the robustness of the underlying
ML systems. Moreover, such drifts can be exploited by the
adversaries to create adversarial samples during inference, for
example, in [236] authors investigated this distribution drift
by introducing positively connotated words in spam emails to
evade detection. Moreover, modification of the training distri-
bution is also possible in a similar way and distribution drift
violates the widely known presumption that we can achieve
low learning error when a large training data is available. Ford
at al. [237] have presented empirical and theoretical evidence
that adversarial examples are a consequence of test error in
noise caused by a distributional shift in the data. To ensure
that the adversarial defense is trustworthy, it must provide
defense against data distribution shifts. As the perception
system of CAVs is mainly based on data-driven modeling
using historical training data, it is highly susceptible to the
problem of distribution drifts. Therefore, robustifying ML
models against the aforementioned distribution drifts is very
important. One way to counter this problem is to leverage
deep reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms for developing
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the perception system of autonomous vehicles but this is not
yet practically possible, as the state and action spaces in
realistic settings (road and vehicular environment) are con-
tinuous and very complex. Therefore, fine control is required
for the efficacy of the system [156]. However, the work on
leveraging deep RL-based methods for autonomous vehicles
is building up. For instance, Sallab et al. proposed a deep RL-
based framework for autonomous vehicles that enables the
vehicle to handle partially observable scenarios [238]. They
investigated the effectiveness of their system using an open
source 3D car racing simulator (TORCS8) and demonstrated
that their model was able to learn complex road curvatures
and simple inter-vehicle interactions. On the counter side,
deep RL-based systems have been shown vulnerable to policy
induction attacks [239].
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The recent discoveries that machine learning (ML) tech-
niques are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations have raised
questions on the security of connected and autonomous ve-
hicles (CAVs), which utilize ML techniques for various tasks
ranging from environmental perception to objection recogni-
tion and movement prediction. The safety-critical nature of
CAVs clearly demands that the technology it uses should
be robust to all kinds of potential security threats—be they
accidental, intentional, or adversarial. In this work, we present
for the first time a comprehensive analysis of the challenges
posed by adversarial ML attacks for CAVs aggregating insights
from both the ML and CAV literature. Our major contributions
include: a broad description of the ML pipeline used in CAVs;
description of the various adversarial attacks that can be
launched on the various components of the CAV ML pipeline;
a detailed taxonomy of the adversarial ML threat for CAVs; a
comprehensive survey of adversarial ML attacks and defenses
proposed in literature. Finally, open research challenges and
future directions are discussed to provide readers with the
opportunity to develop robust and efficient solutions for the
application of ML models in CAVs.
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